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1. Please note that this is a hypothetical situation intended to illustrate how predictive policing is
or may be used in the future by some police departments. The Chicago Police Department currently
employs CompStat in its operations and not the technology described above.
2. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144 (1972) (creating the term “high-crime area”).
3. The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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Before walking the streets of his beat in Chicago’s West Englewood
neighborhood, on October 25, 2017, Officer Adams uses one of the station’s computers to get the latest report on today’s forecasted criminal activity.1 The report designates part of Officer Adams’ beat, specifically the
500-foot radius around the intersection of South Ashland Avenue and West
72nd Street, as a “high-crime area”2 for brown-heroin trafficking. The statistical output from the Chicago Police Department’s sophisticated predictive
policing software indicates that at around 8:22 P.M., Officer Adams can
anticipate that a gang-related brown-heroin trafficking transaction will
occur at this location. At 8:26 P.M, Officer Adams observes two young
black men huddled closely together; one of them is holding a plastic bag at
the corner of South Ashland Avenue and 73rd Place, which is located approximately 1,000 feet from the anticipated drug trafficking location. Before Officer Adams acts to stop-and-frisk the two men, he must decide
whether his minimal observations—the two men huddled together while
one holds a plastic bag—combined with the high-crime designation 1,000
feet north of this location, is enough to establish reasonable suspicion. Is it?
The United States Supreme Court has yet to hear a case addressing issues related to law enforcement’s use of data-driven tips from predictive
policing software. However, soon, the courts will need to address how data
from predictive policing software factors into the Fourth Amendment’s3
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reasonable suspicion calculus because this software is becoming increasingly popular4 and is revolutionizing policing practices across the United
States. Predictive policing technologies have become so powerful that these
complex computerized algorithms5 can now help reveal localized future
crime patterns before they even emerge.6
Predictive policing is defined as using quantitative analysis to make
statistical predictions to suggest probable targets for criminal activity, prevent crime, and solve past crimes.7 The theory that crime is predictable is
well documented.8 Studies have demonstrated that criminals are creatures
of habit, committing the same types of crimes that they have successfully
committed in the past.9 Not only do criminals repeatedly commit the same
types of crimes, they also tend to commit subsequent crimes in close geographic proximity to the original crime at approximately the same time of
day as the original crime.10 For decades, law enforcement agencies have
taken advantage of this predictability by linking geospatial information to
past crime data.11 Police departments initially placed pushpins on paper
maps to reveal clusters of criminal activity within a jurisdiction; however,
recent technological advances have enabled police departments to move
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4. Leslie A. Gordon, Predictive Policing May Help Bag Burglars—but it May Also be a Constitutional Problem, A.B.A. J. (Sept. 1, 2013),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/predictive_policing_may_help_bag_burglars—
but_it_may_also_be_a_constitutio/.
5. Beth Pearsall, Predictive Policing: The Future of Law Enforcement?, 266 NAT’L INST. JUST.
J. (June 2010), http://www.nij.gov/journals/266/Pages/predictive.aspx (In the case of predictive policing
software, an algorithm is a complex mathematical formula “taking data from disparate sources, analyzing them and then using results to anticipate, prevent and respond more effectively to future crime.”).
6. For example, the Santa Cruz Police Department uses PredPol software to forecast crime using
a complex algorithm that takes information about past crimes and makes projections on a daily basis
about which locations and windows of time have a heightened risk for crime. See Erica Goode, Sending
the Police before There’s a Crime, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/us/16police.html.
7. WALTER L. PERRY ET AL., PREDICTIVE POLICING: THE ROLE OF CRIME FORECASTING IN LAW
ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS 1–2 (2013).
8. See Gordon, supra note 4 (quoting George Mason University Professor, Cynthia Lum, who
says that crime is predictable—”[i]t’s most likely to occur tomorrow where it occurred yesterday. We
know that about offenders too: People who commit crimes are likely to commit them again.”).
9. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
10. Id.; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data Policing in the Big Apple, HUFFINGTON POST, July
15, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/andrew-guthrie-ferguson/big-data-policing-in-the_b_5588009.html
[hereinafter Ferguson, Big Data] (explaining “certain crimes—burglary, car theft, and theft from automobiles—are rather dependent on place and opportunity.”).
11. See Nate Berg, Predicting Crime, LAPD-style: Cutting Edge Data-Driven Analysis Directs
Los Angeles Patrol Officers to Likely Future Crime Scenes—but Critics Worry that Decision-Making by
Machine will Bring ‘tyranny of the algorithm’, THE GUARDIAN, June 25, 2014,
http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/jun/25/predicting-crime-lapd-los-angeles-police-data-analysisalgorithm-minority-report.
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beyond this rudimentary system of prediction. Many law enforcement
agencies now use sophisticated computer programs to leverage complex
algorithms to link and analyze vast datasets, and reveal previously unseen
crime patterns.12 Police departments use information obtained from these
statistical analyses to inform their police work.13
Although predictive policing technology has an array of the potential
uses, the scope of this Note is limited to addressing how the statistical outputs from these technologies can be factored into the reasonable suspicion
calculus to reduce the number of Terry stops14 performed in alleged highcrime areas. Predictive policing technology can be used to corroborate a
police officer’s “high-crime area” designation and help restore eroded
Fourth Amendment protections to these neighborhoods. As the use of sophisticated predictive policing software becomes more widespread,15 courts
will need to address the role that data from this technology plays in corroborating an officer’s finding of reasonable suspicion in alleged high-crime
areas.16
Courts all over the United States have struggled to define “highcrime area” since the Supreme Court’s decision in Illinois v. Wardlow.17
Wardlow essentially reduced the reasonable suspicion “totality of the circumstances” analysis to a two-factor test in certain geographic areas: permitting the characterization of a neighborhood as “high-crime” to serve as a
plus-factor for finding reasonable suspicion.18 However, the Wardlow
Court failed to define the term “high-crime area.”19 Furthermore, the Court
did not offer any guidance regarding the evidentiary showing necessary to
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 159 Side A
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12. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 2.
13. Gordon, supra note 4 (explaining that departments use data outputs to allocate personnel,
reduce environmental vulnerabilities in neighborhoods, identify future crime hotspots, and generally
reduce crime and recidivism).
14. Please note that the author uses the terms “stop and frisk” and “Terry Stop” interchangeably
throughout this Note. A “Terry stop” is a general exception to the rule that a police officer must have
probable cause to search a suspect. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983). A lawful Terry stop
permits a police officer to perform a brief seizure and partial search of a criminal suspect, when the
totality of the circumstances leads the officer to believe that criminal activity may be afoot. Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). The partial search, or “frisk authority applies only when a concern about
violence exists.” Fabio Arcila Jr., Nuance, Technology, and the Fourth Amendment: A Response to
Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 63 EMORY L.J. 87, 89 (2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2464257 (citation omitted).
15. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J.
259, 262 (2012).
16.. See id. at 312.
17. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000).
18. See id.
19. See Hannah Rose Wisniewski, It’s Time to Define High-Crime: Using Statistics in Court to
Support an Officer’s Subjective “High-Crime Area” Designation, 38 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 101, 106 (2012).
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corroborate a police officer’s assertion that a neighborhood has a high propensity for crime.20 Lacking guidance, the lower courts have taken a haphazard approach to defining the term “high-crime area,” leading to
amorphous and inconsistent definitions across jurisdictions.21 Thus, courts
have generally deferred to a police officer’s subjective belief that an area is
high-crime, and have not required law enforcement agencies to corroborate
an officer’s belief with quantitative evidence.22
The courts’ failure to require law enforcement agencies to present
concrete evidence demonstrating that a neighborhood has a heightened
propensity for crime raises significant constitutional concerns. Areas defined as “high-crime” tend to disproportionately represent low-income and
minority neighborhoods.23 Courts’ deference to police officers’ subjective
experiences has created significant animosity between the residents of these
neighborhoods and law enforcement.24 The high-crime label often coincides with an increased police presence in these neighborhoods.25 Moreover, using the high-crime designation as a plus factor in a two-factor
totality of the circumstances test, lowers the threshold for reasonable suspicion in these neighborhoods, and ultimately strips residents of critical con-
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20. See id.
21. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bernache, The “High-Crime Area” Question:
Requiring Verifiable and Quantifiable Evidence for Fourth Amendment Reasonable Suspicion Analysis,
57 AM. U. L. REV. 1587, 1605, 1607–08 (2008).
22. See id. at 1607–08 (providing examples of the many incantations of high-crime area definitions and the array of evidence offered in various courts to support these definitions); Lenese C. Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9
GEO. J. ON POV. L. & POL’Y 135, 136–36 (2002) (explaining that in her experience as an Assistant
United States Attorney she would question police officers about their high-crime area characterizations
before trial, and how judges never asked for data to support these assertions in court).
23. David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677–78 (1994); see also David Seawall, Wardlow’s Case: A Call to
Broaden The Perspective of American Criminal Law, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 1119, 1131 (2001) (stating
“due to the politics of past and present racism, minority members are often forced to live in povertystricken, crime-riddled communities, and this segregation continues despite race-neutral policies.”).
24. Suspect Fits Description: Responses to Racial Profiling in New York City: A Panel Discussion with Darius Charney, Jesus Gonzalez, David Kennedy, Noel Leader, and Robert Perry, 14 CUNY
L. REV. 57, 63–64 (2010) (stating “I have not been any place where there is a lot of street action of this
kind, where a lot of it was not transparently, inherently, flagrantly illegal . . . . Because of all of that, it
undercuts the legitimacy, especially of the police in these communities and the alternative to having a
legitimate law enforcement presence in the community is community self-help. And that is part of the
reason that in these communities we are seeing the growth of a “stop snitching” and vendetta culture,
because people feel that they have no recourse to law and order to deal with their personal and social
problems”); see Seawall, supra note 23, at 1131 (explaining that the “high-crime area designation as a
basis for increased legal justification of police, and the diminished expectations of privacy for residents,
only perpetuate this distrust and the politics of identification.”).
25. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW (2012) (arguing that the War on
Drugs has led to heavy policing in low-income and minority neighborhoods and ushered in an era of
mass incarceration and structural racism in our criminal justice system).
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26. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Crime Mapping and the Fourth Amendment: Redrawing
“High-Crime Areas”, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 179, 209, 214–15 (2011) [hereinafter Ferguson, Crime Mapping].
27. See id.
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stitutional protections.26 Thus, individuals living in these neighborhoods do
not enjoy the same level of Fourth Amendment protections as individuals
residing in wealthier whiter neighborhoods.27
However, the prevalent use of predictive policing software and its increasing sophistication provides courts with an opportunity to narrowly
define high-crime areas based on both geography and specific crime type.
Requiring law enforcement to use narrow crime-specific definitions, and
requiring these agencies to present quantitative evidence that supports these
designations will help restore eroded Fourth Amendment protections to
people living in neighborhoods historically stamped with the high-crime
label. This Note argues that uniform standards and best practices must be
developed to guide law enforcement’s use of predictive policing software.
This software should be leveraged as a tool to help restore previously eroded Fourth Amendment rights.
Part I briefly describes the development of predictive policing technologies. It illustrates this technology’s ability to inform high-crime area
classifications based on both geography and specific crime type, and describes the relevant limitations of this technology. Part II describes the
erosion of Fourth Amendment protections for individuals in designated
high-crime areas since Terry v. Ohio, and focuses on the deterioration of
the totality of circumstances test into a two-factor test in Illinois v. Wardlow. It also illustrates how courts have struggled to define the term “highcrime area.” Part III describes the effect that heavy policing and the highcrime area label has had on low-income and minority neighborhoods. Part
IV focuses on the role of technology in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Part V argues that courts must require objective data to evaluate whether an
area is “high-crime.” It argues that Congress should pass legislation to establish uniform standards to guide the use of predictive policing technologies. Implementing uniform standards and best practices would ensure fair,
accurate, and reliable data collection and analysis, enabling courts to reasonably rely on statistical outputs from these technologies in evidence suppression hearings.
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I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND CAPABILITIES OF
PREDICTIVE POLICING TECHNOLOGIES

CompStat, the precursor to the latest generation of predictive policing
technologies, emerged in New York in 1994.28 The New York City Police
Department (NYPD) used CompStat to compile statistical data to show
when and where different types of crime occurred in the city.29 The NYPD
used this data to distribute personnel and tailor its policing strategies to
address these “hotspots” of criminal activity—revolutionizing the NYPD’s
operations.30 Under the CompStat system, data was collected and analyzed
weekly, and precinct commanders met every few weeks with the Department’s leadership to discuss crime statistics and modify their policing strategies as needed.31 CompStat’s implementation created a constant feedback
loop for the NYPD and “coincided with a staggering decline in crime” in
New York City.32 Police departments across the United States began using
the CompStat system after they learned about the NYPD’s success.33 Although experts continue to debate the role of CompStat in facilitating New
York City’s declining crime rate in the 1990s and early 2000s,34 this software paved the way for the development of the latest emerging predictive
policing technologies, which are used today by law enforcement agencies
across the United States.35
A. General Overview of New Predictive Policing Technologies

01/14/2015 15:25:42

28. Tina Rosenberg, Armed With Data, Fighting More Than Crime, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2012,
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/armed-with-data-fighting-more-than-crime/
(“The ideas in CompStat were first developed by Jack Maple, when he was a lieutenant in the New
York City Transit Police, as a way to track subway crime and more intelligently deploy transit cops. In
1994, when William Bratton, the chief of the transit police, became chief of the New York City Police
Department he brought Maple with him as deputy. They then applied CompStat principles throughout
the city’s entire crime fighting operation.”).
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Id. (noting that before the implementation of CompStat, reports on crimes and arrests were
turned in every few months).
32. Id.
33. See id. (noting that a recent survey by the Police Executive Research Forum “found that 79
percent of medium to large police departments surveyed use some form of the CompStat model.”).
34. Id.
35. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 4–5.
36. See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 269–70.
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The development of next generation predictive policing programs has
garnered not only national attention but also federal financing because of
the software’s cost-effectiveness, high-tech image, and promising test results.36 The latest predictive policing programs appear to reduce crime
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without significantly disrupting other policing efforts in the small geographic areas where they have been tested.37 Moreover, in an era of significant budget cuts, law enforcement agencies are taking advantage of the fact
that this software seamlessly blends into their existing crime-fighting operations and saves money by more efficiently allocating resources.38
Predictive policing technology is built upon the popular understanding that criminals are creatures of habit: they repeatedly commit the same
types of crimes at around the same time of day in the same geographic
area.39 Studies have generally shown that certain property crimes, such as
burglary, are highly predictable.40 Generally, predictive policing models
rely on an assumption that criminals are rational decision-makers who
commit crimes by exploiting opportunities created under certain conditions.41 The latest predictive policing software uses “years—sometimes
decades—worth of crime reports, [and] the algorithm analyses [sic] the
data to identify areas with high probabilities for certain types of crime,
placing little red boxes on maps of the city that are streamed into patrol
cars.”42 Captain John Romero of the Los Angeles Police Department, explains, “Burglars tend to be territorial, so once they find a neighborhood
where they get good stuff, they come back again and again . . . [a]nd that
assists the algorithm in placing the boxes.”43 Historically, the use of predictive policing technologies has been limited to tracking, analyzing, and predicting property crimes44 because the software was designed to predict
“where and when crime is mostly likely to occur, not who will commit
it.”45 However, unlike CompStat, which relied on data of past criminal
activity to extrapolate patterns and predict future criminal activity, the new
generation of predictive policing technologies is forward-looking, and truly
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 161 Side A
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37. Id. (citations omitted).
38. Goode, supra note 6.
39. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 272 (stating “[i]t is now generally acknowledged that crime does
not randomly disperse across a geographic area”).
40. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 2–3.
41. Joel Rubin, Stopping Crime Before it Starts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/aug/21/local/la-me-predictcrime-20100427-1 (stating “a would-be
criminal must find a target that is sufficiently vulnerable to attack and that offers an appealing payout.
An empty house with no alarm on a poorly lighted street, for example, has a much higher chance of
being burglarized than one with a barking dog on a busy block.”).
42. Berg, supra note 11.
43. Id. PredPol is a popular predictive policing program developed by a private company and is
being used by law enforcement agencies all over the world. See generally SacBee Online—Predpol
Results in “Dramatic Crime Reduction”, PREDPOL, Oct. 16, 2013, http://www.predpol.com/sacbeeonline-predpol-results-in-dramatic-crime-reduction/.
44. Gordon, supra note 4.
45. Berg, supra note 11.
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predictive.46 As will be described below, the latest software can analyze
vast and complex data sets in near real time speeds to reveal previously
unseen patterns of crimes.47
As the capabilities of these programs have advanced, police departments have begun to experiment with using the software to predict other
types of crimes, such as gun violence and gang activity.48 Although predictive policing technology has many potential uses,49 this Note focuses on
how this software can be used by law enforcement and the courts to identify and classify high-crime areas by specific crime type and geography. To
illustrate how this software works and what it is capable of, the following
two sections describe two analytic models that are particularly good at
forecasting where and what type of criminal activity will occur: the near
repeat model and the risk terrain model (RTM).
B. The Near Repeat Model
The near repeat model for predictive policing technology assumes that
crime spreads through local environments on a micro-scale like a contagious disease.50 Thus, when certain crimes occur at a location, these crimes
tend to create repeat criminal activity in the same location.51 Professor
Mohler of Santa Clara University has created an “earthquake modeling”
algorithm based on this near repeat model.52 The earthquake modeling algorithm draws a grid over a jurisdiction and estimates the background rate
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46. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 265 n.31.
47. See generally PERRY ET AL., supra note 7 (discussing the various data-mining techniques
underlying new crime forecasting software).
48. Douglas Belkin, Chicago Hunts for Answers to Gang Killings: Police Build Facebook-Like
Database to Prevent Swift Cycles of Retaliation, WALL ST. J., July 12, 2012,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303644004577520863051001848
(explaining that Chicago implemented a program tracking the social connections of many of the city’s
gangs to try to keep them apart in the critical hours after an attack); Can Software that Predicts Crime
Pass Constitutional Muster?, NPR.ORG (July 26, 2013),
http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=205835674 (discussing how Seattle has
expanded its use of its predictive policing program, PredPol, to predict gun violence in the city); see
also Gordon, supra note 4.
49. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 8 (describing how these technologies are evolving to include
capabilities such as identifying future offenders, creating offender profiles to match likely offenders
with future crimes, and identifying potential crime victims); Berg, supra note 11 (describing how
various law enforcement agencies across the United States are using PredPol as part of their policing
strategies).
50. G.O. Mohler et al., Self-Exciting Point Process Modeling of Crime, 106 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N,
100, 100 (2011), available at http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/uasa20#.VCmY1fldUk0.
51. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 277 n.103 (“Research demonstrates that prior victimisation is a
very good predictor of future risk and that when it occurs, repeat victimisation tends to occur swiftly.”).
52. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 42; see also Ferguson, supra note 15, at 268.
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at which new crime appears in each cell of the grid.53 When a new crime
occurs in a cell, the algorithm assumes that the rate for the new crime will
temporarily increase, like an aftershock following an earthquake.54 Over
time, the rate for new crime declines the longer the cell goes without seeing
any new crime, similar to how the aftershocks of an earthquake diminish
over time.55 As one of PredPol’s developers, Jeffrey Brantingham, explains, “[C]rime hotspots pop up and spread and disappear and pop up
again in really complicated ways that are just very, very difficult, if not
impossible, for the individual to intuit.”56 Thus, to ensure accuracy when
using the near repeat model, agencies must regularly input new data into
the software because without up-to-date information, the utility of the software’s predictions will diminish over time.57
Software based on the near repeat model has a high-rate of success
for predicting where and when burglaries are likely to occur in an area.58
Although the near repeat model can accurately predict patterns in property
crimes, it is unclear whether this model can effectively forecast other types
of crime, such as gun violence or crimes of passion.59 However, the results
of one study were promising. The study showed that the near repeat model
accurately forecasted the location of violent rival-gang related activity.60
These findings support the proposition that in evidence suppression hearings, courts could rely on statistical outputs from predictive policing software to evaluate a police officer’s claim that a particular stop-and-frisk
occurred in a high-crime area.
C. Risk Terrain Modeling (RTM)

01/14/2015 15:25:42

53. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 42. See also Ferguson, supra note 15, at 268 (describing the
Santa Cruz Police Departments use of Mohler’s software).
54. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 42.
55. Id.
56. Berg, supra note 11.
57. See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 281.
58. See PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 42 (detailing studies using near repeat theory to predict
burglaries).
59. Id. at 44.
60. Mohler et al., supra note 50, at 100 (citations omitted).
61. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 51.
62. Id.
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The risk terrain model serves as the foundation for some predictive
policing software. RTM uses geographic information systems to identify
geographic features that contribute to elevated crime risk and overlays
them onto a base map.61 Potential geographic features used to predict crime
risk in this model include: bars, liquor stores, and strip clubs.62 RTM is akin
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63. See id.
64. See id.
65. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 281 (citing Leslie Kennedy et al., Risk Clusters, Hot Spots, and
Spatial Intelligence: Risk Terrain Modeling as a Algorithm for Police Resource Allocation Strategies,
27 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 339, 345–46 (2011)).
66. Id. at 282.
67. Id. (citations omitted).
68. Id. (citations omitted).
69. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 53–55.
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to a base map with layers of tracing paper laid on top of it—as more environmental features are plotted on top of each other, clusters of potential
criminal activity are revealed based on these existing features.63 The model’s algorithm then makes predictions about an area’s risk for crime based
on how close the selected geographic location is to identified environmental features.64
Unlike the near repeat model, the RTM predicts crimes based on the
interactions between behavioral, social, physical, and environmental factors, instead of solely using information about where and when past criminal activity occurred.65 For example, in Morris County, New Jersey, a RTM
map was created to analyze burglaries.66 The map was generated using five
variables: “(1) past burglaries, (2) the residential location of individuals
arrested for theft or burglary between 2009 and 2011, (3) the proximity to
major highways, (4) the geographic concentration of males between the
ages of 16 and 24, and (5) the location of apartment complexes and hotels.”67 Morris County police administrators used the map to direct their
resources to high-risk areas, which led to a general decrease in crime, and
more specifically, decreases in both violent and property crimes.68 RTM is
considered genuinely predictive; it forecasts future crime using a location’s
geographic and environmental attributes rather than relying on data related
to past criminal activity in that area.69 Hence, software based on RTM
could potentially be used to accurately forecast potential hotspots for specific types of criminal activity.
Although new predictive policing software has the potential to precisely define high-crime areas, the models underlying the software have
limitations. The following section describes the general limitations of predictive policing technologies. Part V describes how to overcome these limitations to ensure that these technologies produce fair, accurate, and reliable
data that courts can use to decide whether the high-crime label is appropriate for an area.
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D. General Limitations of Predictive Policing Technologies
Although predictive policing software provides law enforcement
agencies with a powerful tool that can help them efficiently allocate crime
fighting resources, these technologies have some common limitations.
First, effective use of predictive policing technologies requires reliability,
transparency, and accuracy in data collection and analysis; without safeguards in place, data is susceptible to human fallibility.70 Second, taken
alone, predictive policing software cannot establish the requisite level of
particularized suspicion required to perform a lawful Terry stop (premised
on reasonable suspicion).71
1. Humans Create Data, Which Leaves it Fallible to Human Error

01/14/2015 15:25:42

70. See Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 10.
71. See Arcila, supra note 14, at 90.
72. See Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 10; see also Berg, supra note 11 (writing that one expert
worries that “there’s too much submissive acceptance of these technologies by the public, without
consideration of exactly how this data is collected and used.”).
73. Quentin Hardy, Why Big Data is Not Truth, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/01/why-big-data-is-not-truth/.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Uniform Crime Reports, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/ucr (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
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Currently, there are no uniform standards or best practices in place to
guide police departments as they collect the data that will be used as inputs
for statistical analysis. Data creation requires humans to select what information to collect and what information to discard—similar to the old adage, “garbage in, garbage out.”72 An uninformed user may believe that the
representation of “previously unseen truths” generated by predictive policing software tells an entirely objective story.73 However, this is not the
case, because “[d]ata is something we create”74 by making choices about
what information to collect and the method used to collect it. Thus, police
departments and courts should proceed cautiously when evaluating the
statistical outputs from predictive policing algorithms because “[t]he word
‘data’ connotes fixed numbers inside hard grids of information and as a
result, it is easily mistaken for fact.”75
Moreover, humans select the language used to describe data—there
is no mandatory program in place to guide data classification. Unfortunately, there is a common misconception that local law enforcement agencies
are required to conform to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program standards to classify crimes.76
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77. A Word About UCR Data, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/word (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. Hardy, supra note 75.
82. Somini Sengupta, In Hot Pursuit of Numbers to Ward Off Crime, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2013,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/19/in-hot-pursuit-of-numbers-to-ward-off-crime/.
83. Id.; see Berg, supra note 11 (quoting Jennifer Lynch, senior staff attorney at the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, who says that with these technologies “what we forget is that the information that
went in may have been subject to bias . . . may have been collected in certain communities more than
other communities. The problem is technology legitimizes somehow the problematic policing that was
the origination of the data to begin with.”).
84. See Berg, supra note 11; Sengupta, supra note 82; see generally ALEXANDER, supra note 25
(discussing how the War on Drugs has contributed to heavy policing of low-income and minority
neighborhoods).
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However, when reviewing the UCR Handbook it becomes clear that this
program is permissive, and the FBI merely recommends that agencies conform to its classification system.77 As the FBI explains on its website,
“[O]ffense definitions may vary from state to state” and the FBI asks
“agencies to report offenses not according to local or state statutes but according to those guidelines provided in the handbook.”78 The FBI notes that
“[m]ost agencies make a good faith effort to comply with established
guidelines,”79 however, compliance is not required. Hence, law enforcement agencies have discretion to describe crime data even when reporting
to the FBI under the UCR Program.80 As such, one might say, the data is
“only as good as the people using it.”81
Moreover, critics of predictive policing technologies suggest that datadriven policing may create “self-fulfilling cycles of bias” for police departments using this information to make resource allocation decisions.82
For example, if statistical outputs suggest that a neighborhood is a “highcrime area”, a law enforcement agency may police that area more heavily
than others. This increased police presence may in turn generate more arrests in the neighborhood because of the increased crime detection capacity. Thus, when new arrest data is added to the predictive policing software,
it may reinforce a department’s original prediction by directing crimefighting resources to an area that is already heavily policed. The algorithm
then gives the impression that there are heightened levels of criminal activity in that neighborhood, when in reality, more criminals are getting caught
because there are more police officers present to detect crime.83 Heightened
police presence in a neighborhood can lead to more stop-and-frisks and
skew the data, so it appears that one neighborhood has a higher crime rate
than other areas.84 Thus, without safeguards in place, data analytics and
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data collection are susceptible to human fallibility. “Predictive policing can
be a very useful tool, but it is just that—a tool. It is not a crystal ball.”85
2. Predictive Policing Technologies Cannot Establish Particularized
Suspicion that Criminal Activity is Afoot

01/14/2015 15:25:42

85. PERRY ET AL., supra note 7, at 7.
86. See Margaret Raymond, Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Considering the Character of
the Neighborhood in Evaluating Reasonable Suspicion, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 101–02 (1999).
87. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 27 (1968).
88. Berg, supra note 11.
89. Sengupta, supra note 82.
90. Id.
91. Berg, supra note 11.
92. See Arcila, supra note 14, at 90.
93. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123–24 (2000).
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Under the Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion analysis, performing a lawful stop-and-frisk of a suspect requires police officers to have a
particularized suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.86 In order to justify a
Terry stop, an officer needs to observe a person acting suspiciously.87 Because predictive policing software uses probabilities to predict when and
where criminal activity is likely to occur,88 a police officer cannot use the
statistical data derived from this software as his sole basis for justifying a
Terry stop. In other words, these technologies can provide generalized predictions of criminal activity but they cannot establish the requisite particularized suspicion required by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonable
suspicion calculus. For example, Seattle’s PredPol software predicted that a
robbery would unfold in a “tiny patch of downtown that is dotted with liquor stores and loiterers.”89 A robbery occurred in the area as predicted.
However, “not one that a computer program could have predicted: a thief
walked into a Chinese restaurant and made off with a live crab.”90
As one expert laments, “[T]echnology such as predictive policing creates ‘categorical suspicion’ of people in predicted crime areas, which can
lead to unnecessary questioning or excessive stopping-and-searching.”91
Thus, reliance on statistical outputs from predictive policing technologies
must be limited to helping an officer develop a generalized suspicion about
imminent criminal activity.92 An officer still needs to observe a specific
person behaving suspiciously in order to perform a lawful Terry stop in an
alleged high-crime area.93 The concepts of particularized suspicion and the
reasonable suspicion calculus are described in more detail below.
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II. FROM TERRY TO WARDLOW: ERODING FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS IN AMORPHOUS HIGH-CRIME AREAS
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . ,”94 and requires police officers to conform to a “a
standard of reasonableness” when engaging with private individuals “to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions . . . .”95 However, the Supreme Court has chipped away at this constitutional protection since its groundbreaking decision in Terry v. Ohio in
1968.96 The Terry Court carved out an exception to the probable cause
requirement for searches and seizures, and developed a new threshold
standard of reasonable suspicion.97 In 2000, the Court further weakened
Fourth Amendment protections in Illinois v. Wardlow, where an ambiguously defined “high-crime area” designation was permitted to serve as one
of only two factors in finding reasonable suspicion to perform a lawful
Terry stop.98 In the wake of Wardlow, lower courts have struggled to define
high-crime areas in evidence suppression hearings.
A. Terry v. Ohio (1968): The Origins of the “Terry Stop,” the Totality
of the Circumstances Analysis, and the Path to “High-Crime Area”
Designations

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653–54 (1979) (citations omitted).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
See generally id.
See generally 528 U.S. 119.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
See Raymond, supra note 86, at 102.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.

01/14/2015 15:25:42

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
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Terry v. Ohio established the reasonable suspicion standard. Under the
reasonable suspicion standard, a police officer may perform a lawful “Terry
stop,” a brief seizure and a partial search of a criminal suspect, when the
totality of the circumstances lead the officer to believe criminal activity is
afoot.99 The totality of the circumstances test uses an objective standard to
assess what a trained police officer would reasonably believe in the context
of a specific stop.100 A police officer must “point to specific and articulable
facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”101 The test is a “practical, nontechnical
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conception”102 balancing direct observations of a suspect’s behavior and the
entire context of a stop to establish particularized suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot.103 In order to perform a lawful Terry stop, an officer needs
more than a “hunch”; he must directly observe suspicious behavior.104 The
officer must demonstrate that actions of the suspect somehow “distinguish[ed] that individual from the larger universe of law-abiding citizens.”105 Moreover, “[t]he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and
justified by’ the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”106
Thus, the Terry Court viewed this new reasonable suspicion standard as
carving out “limited exceptions to the general rule that seizures of the person require probable cause to arrest.”107
There are two scenarios in which lawful Terry stops arise. The first
type of Terry stop occurs when an officer fears imminent danger to himself,
and the context in which, the Terry Court envisioned these stops would
occur.108 In this situation, an officer can conduct an over the clothes pat
down of a suspect limited to a search for weapons.109 The second scenario,
developed after the Terry decision;110it arises when an officer observes a
suspect’s behavior and believes that a specific type of criminal activity is
afoot based on these observations.111 In this scenario, an officer’s search
should be limited to frisking for evidence related to the specific suspected

35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 165 Side A
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102. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983) (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160,
176 (1949)).
103. See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981) (stating “[b]ased upon that whole
picture the detaining officers must have a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
person stopped of criminal activity.”).
104. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 15 (“courts still retain their traditional responsibility to guard against
police conduct which is over-bearing or harassing, or which trenches upon personal security without the
objective evidentiary justification which the Constitution requires.”).
105. Raymond, supra note 86, at 101–02.
106. Terry 392 U.S. at 10, 17 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring)).
107. Florida. v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499 (1983).
108. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
109. Officer McFadden had reasonable suspicion to believe that Terry was armed and dangerous
and planning to rob a store because McFadden watched three men (including Terry) “pace alternately
along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; where each completion of this route is followed immediately by a conference between the two men on the corner . . . ”
Id.
110. When Chief Justice Warren wrote the Terry opinion, he was concerned about potential abuses
of the power; he tried to prevent abuses of the power to stop-and-frisk by limiting the scope of the
searches to an officer’s fear of imminent danger to himself if he does not stop-and-frisk a suspect. Id. at
10, 17–19. Later decisions expanded the scope of Terry. See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221
(1985); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 241 (5th ed. 2009).
111. See Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227–28; WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET. AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 241
(5th ed. 2009).
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112. Hensley, 469 U.S. at 227–28.
113. Interview with Professor Douglas Godfrey, Professor of Legal Research & Writing, ChicagoKent Coll. of Law, in Chi., Ill. (Oct. 1, 2013).
114. Terry, 392 U.S. at 10, 17.
115. Carol S. Steiker, Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 334 (2013).
116. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STOP AND FRISK: REPORT ON 2011 FINDINGS, available at
http://www.nyclu.org/files/stopandfrisk-factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
117. Id.
118. Id. (stating “[n]ine out of 10 people stopped are totally innocent, meaning they are neither
arrested nor ticketed.”); see also The Editorial Board, More Disclosures About Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/30/opinion/more-disclosures-about-stop-andfrisk.html?_r=0.
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criminal activity.112 For example, a police officer observes members of
Hell’s Angels outside of a motorcycle shop; after observing their behavior,
the officer suspects that they intend to rob the shop. An officer may lawfully perform a limited, over the clothes frisk for a commercial grade lock
cutter or other typical burglary tools.113
Terry stops performed under the purview of the second scenario can
be problematic. When Chief Justice Warren wrote the Terry opinion, he
recognized that the seizure of a person is more than a “mere minor inconvenience and petty indignity[;]” rather, it “is a serious intrusion upon the
sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong
resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.”114 He pointed to thencurrent police scholarship to underscore his concerns that police officers
may abuse their authority to stop-and-frisk, and use it as a means to maintain the image of police power and control in a neighborhood.115 Chief
Justice Warren’s hypothetical concerns about law enforcement abusing the
power to stop-and-frisk in the Terry stop context recently became reality in
New York City.
The NYPD has been accused of targeting certain demographics (i.e.,
young minority men) and performing excessive stop-and-frisks.116A fact
sheet created by the New York Civil Liberties Union observes, “though
they account for only 4.7% of the city’s population, black and Latino males
between the ages of 14–24 accounted for 41.6 [percent] of the stops in
2011,” and that “[t]he number of stops of young black men exceeded the
entire city population of young black men.”117 Studies of the NYPD’s stopand-frisk reports have shown that a disproportionate number of minority
persons have been stopped-and-frisked with a very small number of these
searches leading to arrests.118 In 2000, Wardlow further minimized the required nexus between observed behavior and specific crime type when the
Supreme Court allowed the characterization of a neighborhood as a high-
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crime area to serve as one of only two factors in the totality of the circumstances test.119
B. Illinois v. Wardlow (2000): The Totality of Circumstances Test
Becomes a Two-Factor Test Giving Rise to the Amorphous
“High-Crime Area” Label

01/14/2015 15:25:42

119. See generally 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
120. See id. at 124.
121. Id. (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972)).
122. See id.
123. See Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 26, at 214–15.
124. See id.
125. See Raymond, supra note 86, at 99–102, 115–24 (describing case law showing that whether
reasonable suspicion is found often hinges on whether the ambiguous behavior occurred in a high-crime
area).
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In Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme Court explicitly declared that the
designation of a neighborhood as a “high-crime area” could serve as one of
two required factors in the totality of the circumstances test.120 The Court
explained that “officers are not required to ignore the relevant characteristics of a location in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently
suspicious to warrant further investigation,” and that past precedent permitted this finding.121 Hence, a police officer met the threshold requirement for
reasonable suspicion when he stop-and-frisked Sam Wardlow based on two
factors: (1) Mr. Wardlow’s presence in a known narcotics trafficking area
(i.e., high-crime area), and (2) his “unprovoked flight upon noticing the
police.”122
By relying solely on these two factors to find reasonable suspicion, the
Wardlow Court dramatically expanded the role that neighborhood character
could play in the totality of the circumstances analysis. By giving the highcrime area label significant weight in the reasonable suspicion calculus, the
Court weakened the required nexus between particularized suspicion and
suspected criminal activity.123 The Court effectively bifurcated Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence by according people two different levels of
Fourth Amendment protections based on their geographic location.124
If an individual behaves ambiguously in a designated “high-crime
area,” he is more likely to be stopped-and-frisked because of his presence
in this area than a person who behaves similarly in a neighborhood without
the high-crime label.125 Under Wardlow, standing in an area labeled as
high-crime is enough to create a generalized suspicion of criminal wrong-
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doing.126 When a person’s presence in a high-crime area is coupled with an
ambiguous activity, such as standing on a street corner in the Englewood
neighborhood of Chicago holding a plastic bag, officers are more likely to
interpret ambiguous conduct as indicative of criminal wrongdoing.127
Whereas, standing on a corner and talking to someone while holding a
plastic bag in the wealthy Gold Coast neighborhood of Chicago will likely
not elicit the same response from the police.128 Many Wardlow critics have
questioned whether Wardlow’s presence on a street corner holding a plastic
bag was any more indicative of criminal activity than the actions of the
other 98,000 people living in the same district.129
Although the Wardlow decision has significantly weakened the
Fourth Amendment protections provided to individuals living in areas labeled as high-crime, the Wardlow Court did recognize that neighborhood
character alone could not justify an officer’s finding of reasonable suspicion.130 The totality of the circumstances test still requires a police officer
to have a particularized suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; this factor
of particularized suspicion appears to carry more weight than the factor of
neighborhood character.131 Thus, taken alone, an individual’s mere presence in a high-crime area without indicia that he is engaged in criminal
activity would not be enough to justify a stop-and-frisk.132 However, because the Supreme Court failed to offer a definition for the “high-crime
area” label or provide guidance to lower courts regarding the evidence
required to prove that an area is indeed high-crime,133 courts have struggled
to develop socially just standards that offer equal levels of Fourth Amendment protections to everyone, regardless of a person’s geographic location.
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 166 Side B
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126. See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 301–03 (describing the ambiguity involved in Wardlow and
the confusing results of creating an unclear standard for individualized suspicion); Ferguson, Crime
Mapping, supra note 26, at 215 (describing how the NYPD conducted 52,000 stop-and-frisks in
Brownsville, Brooklyn an area with a population of 14,000 between 2006 and 2010); Raymond, supra
note 86, at 99–102, 115–24.
127. Id.
128. See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 301–03.
129. Id.
130. 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000) (citing Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 (1979)) (“An individual’s
presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not enough to support a reasonable,
particularized suspicion that the person is committing a crime”).
131. See id. (giving more attention to Wardlow’s unprovoked flight upon seeing the police officers
than his presence in a high-crime area).
132. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979) (establishing reasonable suspicion requires more than
a person’s mere presence in a designated high-crime area).
133. Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 26, at 198.
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C. Post-Wardlow: The Vague High-Crime Area Label Mucks Up
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Wardlow Court did not establish a clear definition for “high-crime
area” or the criteria to use to evaluate the character of an area.134 Courts all
over the United States “began labeling areas as ‘high-crime’ without settling on a definition” or using a uniform method to determine whether an
area is high-crime.135 The absence of a uniform approach to evaluating
neighborhood character has led jurisdictions to haphazardly define and
classify high-crime areas.136 For example, some courts describe high-crime
areas as locations of known drug activity or locations under police surveillance.137 Others will accept an officer’s subjective belief that an area is
high-crime without requiring him to offer facts corroborating his testimony.138 Other courts have labeled an “area of expected criminal activity”139
as high-crime without requiring any data to support this claim.140
Generally, courts have been deferential to the government’s highcrime classifications.141 Courts typically do not require the government to
present quantitative evidence to support its classifications, even though
advancements in crime-mapping technologies have made it possible for
police departments to analyze actual reported crime levels in specific geographic areas and compare crime rates across jurisdictions.142 Crime maps
and analysts’ reports are rarely introduced in court to prove that a Terry
stop actually occurred in a high-crime area.143 For example, in United
States v. Baskin, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the argument that
the government must produce “specific data” to establish that a location is
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 167 Side A
01/14/2015 15:25:42

134. See generally Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
135. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 21, at 1605, 1607–08 (providing examples of the array
of definitions for the term “high-crime area” and evidence offered to support these definitions in different courts); see also United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213, 218–20 (3d Cir. 2004) (Smith, J., concurring) (raising questions about how judges should evaluate the definition and evidence put forth to
establish a high-crime area).
136. See Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 26, at 203–06.
137. Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 21, at 1605 (citing State v. Biehl, No. 22054, 2004 WL
2806340, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2004).
138. Id. at 1608.
139. Id. at 1605.
140. See id. (citing United States v. Baskin, 401 F.3d 788, 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2005)).
141. See id. at 1605–07.
142. Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 26, at 182 (stating, “There is no longer a statistical
question about which areas in fact have higher levels of crime. Maps can be created detailing the last
twenty auto thefts in a given neighborhood, the last three months of drug arrests within a city or the
locations of all the homicides committed in a given year.”).
143. Id. at 198 (indicating that over 1,000 federal and state cases have used the term “high-crime
area” in the context of Fourth Amendment reasonable suspicion without a consistent or sophisticated
definition of the term).
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a “high-crime area.”144 The court held that the location of Baskin’s unprovoked flight remained a relevant factor because the Terry stop occurred
near a “newly discovered” methamphetamine lab in a county park.145 The
court accepted the Government’s decision to designate a park as a highcrime area without requiring the Government to present any actual data to
support its assertion.146
The lack of rigor used to establish an objective basis for defining an
area as high-crime has frustrated some judges.147 Many judges and scholars
have expressed their concern about the continued erosion of Fourth
Amendment protections in neighborhoods haphazardly designated as highcrime.148 For example, the majority opinion in United States v. MonteroCarmargo stated that the court must be careful that the high-crime label
does not just blanket communities “in which members of minority groups
regularly go about their daily business, but is limited to specific, circumscribed locations where particular crimes occur with unusual regularity.”149
Although the Montero-Carmargo Court expressed that it wanted to
exercise caution when applying the high-crime label, it failed to employ
this rigor.150 Judge Kozinski criticizes the majority for deferring to the two
arresting officers’ perception of an area as high-crime as sufficient to label
it as such.151 He warns, “to rely on every cop’s repertoire of war stories to
determine what is a ‘high crime area’—and on that basis to treat otherwise
innocuous behavior as grounds for reasonable suspicion—strikes me as an
invitation to trouble.”152 Judge Kozinski further laments:
The question is not whether the characteristics of the area may be taken
into account, but how these characteristics are established. In our first
opinion to interpret this language from Wardlow, the majority adopts a
35947-ckt_90-1 Sheet No. 167 Side B
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144. 401 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir. 2005).
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. See United States v. Montero-Carmargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring).
148. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 302 n.259 (citing David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 677–78 (1994)); Lenese C.
Herbert, Can’t You See What I’m Saying? Making Expressive Conduct a Crime in High-Crime Areas, 9
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 135, 135–38 (2002); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to
Detain a Suspect, 93 Yale L.J. 214, 255–56 (1983); Raymond, supra note 86, at 116–24; Amy D.
Ronner, Fleeing While Black: The Fourth Amendment Apartheid, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 383,
384–85 (2001); Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 391, 405 (2003); Mia Carpiniello, Note, Striking a Sincere Balance: A Reasonable Black Person
Standard for “Location Plus Evasion” Terry Stops, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 355, 358 (2001)).
149. 208 F.3d at 1138.
150. See id.
151. Id. at 1143 (Kozinski, J., concurring).
152. Id.
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methodology for establishing the characteristics of the area that is about
as rigorous as the recipe for Leftovers Casserole.153

III. LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS ARE
DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACTED BY HEAVY POLICING AND FREQUENT
STOP-AND-FRISKS

01/14/2015 15:25:42

153. Id.
154. Harris, supra note 23, at 677–78; Seawall, supra note 23, at 1131.
155. See ALEXANDER, supra note 25, at 72–96.
156. See N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 116 (detailing the number of stop-and-frisks
performed by NYPD in recent years).
157. See generally 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
158. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 25.
159. MARLA MCDANIEL ET AL., URBAN INST., IMPRISONMENT AND DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF
DISCONNECTED LOW-INCOME MEN 1 (Aug. 2013), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412986-Imprisonment-and-Disenfranchisement-of-DisconnectedLow-Income-Men.pdf.
160. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A NATION BEHIND BARS: A HUMAN RIGHTS SOLUTION 5 (2014),
available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/2014_US_Nation_Behind_Bars_0.pdf (citation
omitted).
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Continuing to permit law enforcement agencies to rely on ambiguous
definitions of high-crime areas comes at a significant cost to the people
who live in these neighborhoods. As noted previously, the high-crime label
tends to attach to hypersegregated, low-income, minority neighborhoods
across the United States.154 Many of these neighborhoods became saturated
with police officers when the United States began its War on Drugs during
the Reagan Administration.155 Heavy policing of these low incomeminority neighborhoods has led to a disproportionate number of people of
color being stopped-and-frisked.156 The Wardlow Court’s transformation of
the reasonable suspicion totality of the circumstances test into a two-factor
test, has made it even easier for police officers to justify Terry stops in
these alleged high-crime areas because courts are deferential to police officers’ subjective beliefs about elevated crime rates in particular neighborhoods.157 Thus, the reduction of the reasonable suspicion test into a twofactor test, and the structural racism built into our criminal justice system
has helped fuel a culture of mass incarceration, and has disproportionately
affected low-income minority neighborhoods.158
Mass incarceration refers to the American cultural phenomenon of
“the imprisonment of comparatively and historically high proportions of
the population that cannot be accounted for by changes in crime rates.”159
Currently, the United States “has the largest reported incarcerated population in the world, and by far the highest rate of imprisonment.”160 The
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161. Id.
162. Id. (citation omitted).
163. MCDANIEL ET AL., supra note 159 (noting that “the U.S. Department of Justice is reviewing
laws and agency enforcement policies that may have had a disparate impact on African Americans and
Hispanics, both in terms of incarceration and the collateral damage to their families and communities.”).
164. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 25.
165. Id. at 125 (describing how “[t]he militarized nature of law enforcement in ghetto communities
has inspired rap artists and black youth to refer to the police presence in black communities as ‘The
Occupation.’”).
166. Id. at 123. Alexander notes that recent studies suggest that white youth are more likely to
participate in illegal drug dealing than people of color. Id. at 99 (citation omitted).
167. Id. at 125.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 124.
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number of prisoners in both federal and state facilities has increased by
nearly 430 percent between 1979 and 2009.161 Moreover, “[r]acial disparities in imprisonment rates are striking. For every 100,000 Americans in
each race or gender group, there are 478 white males, 3,023 black males,
51 white females, and 129 black females incarcerated in state or federal
prison.”162 Undeniably, people of color are disproportionately overrepresented in the criminal justice system.163
In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander describes how the War on
Drugs and the structural racism embedded in our criminal justice system
have devastated low-income minority communities across the United
States.164 The culture of heavy policing created by the War on Drugs in
low-income minority neighborhoods has fostered significant animosity
between the police and residents of these neighborhoods.165 Alexander
observes that even though studies show that rates of drug use are similar
across races, each year a disproportionate number of African American
men are swept into the criminal justice system for low-level drug offenses
because of racially biased police discretion.166
Many scholars and law enforcement agencies have tried to justify
heavily policing low-income minority neighborhoods by arguing that residents of these communities are more likely to engage in illegal activity
outdoors and in plain sight than in higher-income areas.167 These agencies
argue that concentrating drug enforcement efforts in these neighborhoods
enables them to efficiently allocate resources while combating illegal activity.168 However, unlike their wealthier neighbors who would not tolerate
heavy policing, residents of low-income minority neighborhoods often lack
power in our political system, leaving them vulnerable to this biased policing.169 As Alexander notes, “[H]ypersegregation . . . has made the round-up
easy. Confined to ghetto areas and lacking political power, the black poor
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170. Id.
171. Id. at 124–25.
172. Id. at 125.
173. See id. at 136.
174. See id. at 94 (citation omitted) (noting that approximately 2.3 million people were in prisons
or jails as of 2008).
175. Id. at 144–77.
176. See id.
177. Id. at 95 (citing Loïc Wacquant, The New ‘Peculiar Institution’: On the Prison as Surrogate
Ghetto, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377, 384 (2000)).
178. See id. at 95–96.
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are convenient targets.”170
Heavy policing of these low-income neighborhoods has created an
expectation among residents, particularly among young black men, that
they will “be stopped, interrogated, and frisked numerous times in the
course of a month, or even a single week.”171 In her book, Alexander shares
a story from a law student who participated in a ride-along with a Chicago
police officer. The student described how, “[e]ach time we drove into a
public housing project and stopped the car, every young black man in the
area would almost reflexively place his hands up against the car and spread
his legs to be searched.”172 These regular encounters with law enforcement
are problematic because they often function as “the gateway into the criminal justice system” for non-violent, low-level offenses such as marijuana
possession.173
Arrests for low-level non-violent offenses have created a climate
where “a staggering 5.1 million people [are] under ‘community correctional supervision’—i.e., on probation or parole.”174 Moreover, an individual
does not even need to be convicted of a crime to be barred from gainful
employment, access to public housing or other public assistance—getting
arrested is enough to essentially lock someone out of mainstream society.175 Once a person has been swept into the criminal justice system, it is
difficult to get out.176 Scholar, Loïc Wacquant has described this phenomenon “of people cycling in and out of prison” and “trapped by their secondclass status” as a “closed circuit of perpetual marginality.”177 Thus, requiring narrower definitions of high-crime areas could reduce the number of
Terry stops that occur in these neighborhoods. Reducing the number of
Terry stops occurring in these neighborhoods may, in turn, reduce the
number of young minority men who are swept into the criminal justice
system’s “closed circuit of perpetual marginality” for committing lowlevel, non-violent offenses.178
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179. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 78 (2013).
180. Id. at 54 (quoting Judge Hamilton).
181. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (discussing electronic signal transmissions and physical trespass); see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001) (stating that the
question presented to the Court “is what limits there are upon this power of technology to shrink the
realm of guaranteed privacy”); see generally Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)
(discussing the EPA’s use of high-resolution aerial photography).
182. 533 U.S. at 29, 33–34.
183. Id. at 29–30.
184. Id. at 36.
185. See id. at 35–36.
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The courts have not only struggled with defining high-crime areas and
applying Wardlow, they have also had difficulty evaluating the role that
emerging technologies should play in Fourth Amendment analyses. In recent years, technology has become increasingly complex and judges have
had trouble staying abreast of the latest developments. As Judge Posner
lamented in his book, Reflections on Judging, “Federal judges are on the
whole not well adapted by training or experience to the technological age
that we live in.”179 However, as new technologies develop, the courts must
figure out how to embrace these technological advancements because the
“law must apply itself to the life of a society driven more and more by
technology and technological improvements.”180
The Supreme Court has yet to hear a case specifically addressing
the use of predictive policing technology; however, past cases have required the Court to strike a balance between permitting law enforcement to
use emerging technologies and safeguarding Americans’ Fourth Amendment protections.181 For example, when deciding whether police officers’
use of a thermal imaging device constituted an unlawful search of a private
home in Kyllo v. United States, Justice Scalia wrote, “[I]t would be foolish
to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth
Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.”182
In this case, police officers suspected that Kyllo was growing marijuana in
his home and used a thermal imager to determine if the heat emanating
from his home was consistent with the high intensity heat lamps typically
required to grow marijuana.183
Although Justice Scalia recognized that the technology of the particular device used by the officers was “crude,”184 he acknowledged that as
technology evolves, these devices have the potential to reveal all human
activity in the home.185 Anticipating that significant technological ad-
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186. See id. at 35–36, 40.
187. Id. at 38–39.
188. See id.
189. See generally 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
190. Id. at 2480.
191. Id. at 2484 (stating, “These cases require us to decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones, which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude that they were an important feature of human anatomy.”).
192. Id. (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 2491.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2491–92 (citing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 n.19 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 219–20 (1979))).
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vancement was on the horizon, the Court ruled that the use of thermal imaging devices constituted an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.186 Moreover, writing for the Court, Justice Scalia rejected a
case-by-case approach to deciding whether a law enforcement agency’s use
of an emerging technology was lawful.187 Justice Scalia reasoned that before a law enforcement agency uses new technology as part of its policing
efforts, it must know whether the use of such technology is lawful, so the
agency can adjust its policing strategies accordingly.188
The Court’s reasoning in a 2014 case, Riley v. California, further illustrates the Court’s preference for using a long-term and uniform approach
to evaluating the role of new technologies in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.189 The question presented to the Court in Riley was whether the
police may perform a warrantless search of the digital information on a cell
phone seized from a person who was lawfully arrested.190 Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Roberts focused on the sophistication of emerging
technologies, such as the smartphone, and highlighted the pervasiveness of
technology in our society.191 He observed how quickly this technology has
evolved, citing a Pew Research Center Study from 2013, and noting that
even the outdated flip phone technology of one of the arrestees, had “been
around for less than 15 years.”192
After describing the sophistication and prevalence of these
smartphones in our daily lives, the Court rejected the Government’s arguments for permitting warrantless cell phone searches.193 Chief Justice Roberts describes the Court’s “general preference to provide clear guidance to
law enforcement through categorical rules.”194 Quoting Michigan v. Summers, the Court reasoned, “If police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the competing interests . . . ‘must in large part be done on a
categorical basis—not in an ad hoc, case-by-case fashion by individual
police officers.’”195 In order to ensure that law enforcement agencies under-
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196. POSNER, supra note 179, at 72.
197. See id. at 71–72, 78 (using members of the current Supreme Court as examples, Judge Posner
points to the fact that none of them have a graduate or undergraduate degree in a technical field to
illuminate this lack of technical training).
198. Id. at 73.
199. See Ferguson, Crime Mapping, supra note 26, at 203–06.
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stand how they may lawfully use the technology on which they rely, they
need clear categorical rules delineating these parameters—even for emerging technologies.
As Judge Posner further observes in his book, new technologies that
rely on complex mathematical models and statistical analyses can be particularly difficult for judges to understand when compared with technologies of the past, such as the steam engine or the automobile.196 He explains
that compared to the latest emerging technologies, even when technologies
of the past were complex, it was easier to explain how they worked to
judges who did not possess a technical background.197 Evaluating emerging
technologies places judges who do not have technical or scientific backgrounds in uncomfortable territory because they must make sense of “the
kinds of variable[s] that science measures” rather than the soft variables
they are accustomed to in the courtroom.198
Judges’ reluctance to embrace new technology and rely on quantitative data in evidence suppression hearings can be seen in courtrooms across
the country. As discussed previously, courts have been reluctant to rely on
the statistical data that parties have offered as evidence to prove or disprove
a police officer’s assertion that he performed a Terry stop in a high-crime
area.199 However, as predictive policing technologies become increasingly
popular and become an essential law enforcement tool, the courts will not
be able to ignore the existence of these sophisticated technologies.
In order for law enforcement agencies to fully integrate this technology into their daily policing strategies and avoid running afoul of the Fourth
Amendment, these agencies need guidance from the courts. Moreover, as
law enforcement begins to increasingly rely on this technology, Americans
will expect courts to integrate the statistical outputs from these technologies into their reasoning to ensure that individuals’ constitutional rights are
protected. Thus, courts must acknowledge the role of these emerging technologies in law enforcement activities and begin to responsibly integrate
quantitative data into their decision-making processes.
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200. Table 74: 2012 Full-time Law Enforcement Employees, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2012/crime-in-the-u.s.2012/tables/74tabledatadecoverviewpdfs/table_74_full_time_law_enforcement_employees_by_populati
on_group_percent_male_and_female_2012.xls (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (noting that this statistic
includes both sworn officers and civilian employees).
201. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 268–69.
202. See Wisniewski, supra note 20, at 105–06.
203. See Ferguson & Bernache, supra note 21, at 1608.
204. The author recognizes that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence (often referred to as the
Daubert factors) plays a critical role in the admissibility and reliability of technical evidence in the
courtroom; however, this discussion is beyond the purview of this note. This note assumes that these
predictive policing programs will use reliable methods to generate data and establish high-crime areas,
and these methods will be reliably applied.
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A 2012 survey by the FBI identified 14,006 law enforcement agencies
across the United States, which employ 670,439 full-time law enforcement
officers.200 As predictive policing technologies continue to evolve and
technology becomes increasingly integrated into all aspects of our lives, it
is likely that the United States’ roughly 14,000 law enforcement agencies
and their 670,439 officers will choose to incorporate this software into their
day-to-day operations and decision-making processes. In fact,
“[j]urisdictions as diverse as Palm Beach County, Florida; Memphis, Tennessee; Chicago, Illinois; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and Dallas, Texas, are
testing predictive policing” software.201 As the use of predictive policing
software becomes more widespread, it will become impossible for judges
to ignore quantitative data in the courtroom.202 Judges will no longer be
able to defer to police officers’ subjective experiences when defining highcrime areas.203
Therefore, mandatory uniform standards and best practices must be
established to ensure that the information produced by predictive policing
technologies is fair, accurate, reliable and transparent. Congress should call
on the FBI to establish these uniform standards and best practices, and
oversee the implementation of these technologies across law enforcement
agencies. Creating uniform standards will enable the 14,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States to responsibly rely on these technologies
in their day-to-day work. Having the FBI develop and implement these
standards will also enable judges to reasonably rely on data from these
programs when deciding whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to
perform a Terry stop in an alleged high-crime area.204 Most importantly,
integrating quantitative data into the reasonable suspicion analysis will help
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restore eroded Fourth Amendment protections to people living in heavily
policed neighborhoods.
A. Utilize the FBI to Coordinate and Oversee Predictive Policing
Technologies

01/14/2015 15:25:42

205. See Reports and Publications, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/statsservices/publications (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
206. See id. One example of the FBI’s efforts to serve as a clearinghouse for information was
illustrated earlier: the efforts of the FBI to develop uniform crime reporting across the United States.
See Uniform Crime Reports, supra note 76.
207. Quick Facts, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last
visited Nov. 9, 2014).
208. Id.
209. The FBI may help police departments understand that past data may lose its predictive value
if an environmental vulnerability is remediated and changes crime patterns in an area. For example, if
street lights are added on a block where a lot of cars are being stolen, and the police also arrest gang
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Congress should pass legislation requiring the FBI to create mandatory uniform standards and best practices to guide law enforcement agencies
in their use of predictive policing technologies. The FBI is the appropriate
agency to develop these guidelines and to oversee law enforcement agencies across the country for a variety of reasons.
First, as an agency under the umbrella of the United States Department of Justice, the FBI collects an array of information about crime and
other relevant law enforcement topics, demonstrating the FBI’s high-level
of institutional competence in this area.205 For example, the FBI already
uses the information it gathers to generate reports that American law enforcement agencies can use to guide their crime fighting strategies in areas
as diverse as terrorism and white-collar crime.206 Because the FBI has the
capacity to serve as a clearinghouse for information, it is well suited to
develop best practices for collecting and analyzing data.
Second, providing oversight and establishing best practices for the
use of predictive policing technologies in municipal police departments,
aligns with both the FBI’s mission, and its goal of combating public corruption and protecting civil rights.207 The FBI’s mission is “to uphold and
enforce the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leadership
and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and international
agencies and partners.”208 Requiring the FBI to develop mandatory uniform
standards will help the FBI further its mission because the Bureau will lead
the way by developing fair and appropriate technology-based policing
strategies. Moreover, the FBI will further its goals of combating public
corruption and protecting civil rights by helping local law enforcement
agencies understand the limitations of these technologies.209 Creating data-
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neutral policies for local law enforcement to follow will minimize the risk
of unreliable and inaccurate data collection and analysis, and help safeguard Americans’ Fourth Amendment protections.
Third, the FBI is well-equipped to provide neutral third-party oversight because the agency has an extensive and reputable community outreach program.210 Over time, the Bureau has formed many successful
partnerships with law enforcement agencies in the United States and
around the globe.211 The FBI often calls upon former graduates of its National Academy to help train police officers and build interagency relationships to increase the effectiveness of law enforcement operations.212 Thus,
the FBI is already a well-established and well-respected organization capable of working in unison with the 14,000 agencies around the country to
develop mandatory standards and best practices to ensure the responsible
use of predictive policing technology.
B. Establish Mandatory Uniform Standards and Oversight to Ensure
Fairness, Accuracy, Reliability and Transparency

01/14/2015 15:25:42

members who were stealing the cars, then the predictive value of the data outputs from the predictive
policing software will diminish because these environmental vulnerabilities have been addressed. See
Ferguson, supra note 15, at 314.
210. See Partnerships and Outreach, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/partnerships_and_outreach/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (listing FBI partnerships and describing its
community outreach program).
211. See id.
212. The FBI Academy, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/training/national-academy/national-academy (last visited Nov. 9, 2014) (describing the purpose of
the National Academy and the training it offers to local leaders in law enforcement).
213. Refer to Part I of this note for an in-depth discussion of this risk.
214. Ferguson, supra note 15, at 316.
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Establishing mandatory uniform standards that: guide how data is collected and entered into predictive policing programs, provide for routine
audits of local law enforcement’s predictive policing systems, and guide
how algorithms are written, will significantly decrease potential risks associated with human fallibility in big data collection.213 Having the FBI implement uniform standards will help safeguard against “[b]lind reliance on
the forecast, divorced from the reason for the forecast”214 in police departments’ use of predictive policing technologies.
First, new mandatory standards should prescribe procedures that ensure data is systematically gathered and entered into the software on a regular basis. Developing a uniform system for data collection and entry will
reinforce the accuracy of the system’s algorithms, maximize their objective
predictive utility, and help guard against human bias. After all, “[i]f the
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215. See id. at 316–17.
216. See Ferguson, Big Data, supra note 10 (noting concerns about manipulation of crime data
following an audit of the NYPD’s crime statistics).
217. See Ferguson, supra note 15, at 319 (arguing for third party testing and validation of algorithms in order to establish the legitimacy of this technology).
218. See generally 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
219. Joseph Goldstein, Court Blocks Stop-and-Frisk Changes for New York Police, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/nyregion/court-blocks-stop-and-frisk-changes-fornew-york-police.html?emc=edit_na_20131031&nlid=48206195&_r=0 (explaining the allegations that
led to Judge Scheindlin’s removal).
220. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits on Stopand-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasiostop-and-frisk.html.
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data collection, recording, analysis, or retention is flawed, then the entire
system is called into question.”215
Second, when developing these standards, the FBI should require police departments to provide mandatory predictive policing training to their
staff. During this training, law enforcement agencies would describe: permissible methods for data collection, the limitations of this technology as a
crime-fighting tool, and the constitutional concerns triggered by the use of
this technology. The FBI should also provide third-party oversight by conducting routine audits of predictive policing systems. During these audits,
the FBI can ensure that local police departments comply with its mandatory
standards for training, data collection and analysis. By auditing these systems, the FBI can effectively allay concerns about human manipulation of
crime data.216
Third, FBI oversight is needed to validate and test algorithms of predictive policing software. Requiring neutral third party testing of these
algorithms ensures that they paint an unbiased picture of criminal activity,
and do not create self-fulfilling prophecies of bias against any demographic
or geographic location.217 Recently, the need for third party monitoring of
police practices to protect civil liberties was recognized in Floyd v. City of
New York, where the NYPD was accused of abusing its power to stop-andfrisk.218
Although Floyd’s procedural history led to debate about the validity of
the court’s decision,219 the NYPD consented to adhere to some of Judge
Scheindlin’s holdings. Primarily, the NYPD consented to allow third-party
oversight of its aggressive stop-and-frisk program, which led to a disproportionate number of stop-and-frisks taking place in black and Latino
neighborhoods.220 Similar to the NYPD’s stop-and-frisk program, predictive policing algorithms require closer inspection. When law enforcement
uses predictive policing software to allocate resources, civil liberties are at
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stake because inaccurate data collection and algorithms can lead to crime
forecasts tainted by human bias. In order to avoid abuses of police power,
law enforcement must be held accountable for their policing strategies—
especially in already vulnerable low-income minority communities.
A neutral third party testing requirement would also help legitimize
this technology, and make judges more inclined to accept the statistical
outputs from these programs as evidence in the courtroom. Using the FBI
as the gatekeeper for this testing would be particularly advantageous because it would enable private companies developing proprietary algorithms
to maintain their trade secrets, while simultaneously ensuring that the quantitative data output from these programs is reliable. Additionally, requiring
mandatory third party testing and validation of these programs will enable
judges to rely on the quantitative data presented to them by parties in a
courtroom without requiring judges to act as statisticians, who must parse
complex algorithms or evaluate the minutia of data collection techniques.
In this scenario, judges could defer to a sophisticated neutral-party’s opinion about the validity of the data presented and focus on requiring police
departments to define high-crime areas with increased specificity and accuracy.
Moreover, requiring police departments to narrowly define highcrime areas is no Herculean task. A lot of crime data is readily available
and can be plugged into common platforms, such as Google Earth. Thus,
communities need not even rely on expensive proprietary predictive policing software. Instead, they can use these rather rudimentary programs to
track various types of crime and demonstrate a propensity for a specific
type of crime at a specific location.

Neutral third party oversight can bolster the legitimacy of predictive
policing software and transform how judges evaluate high-crime classifications at evidence suppression hearings across the United States.221 As the
use of this technology becomes a ubiquitous part of policing, and standards
are implemented to ensure data reliability, judges should create narrowly
defined high-crime area designations based on not only geographic loca-
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221. Evidence suppression hearings are typically where courts must address whether an officer had
the requisite level of reasonable suspicion required to perform the stop-and-frisk that yielded evidence
to establish a criminal case.
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222. The public’s desire for government transparency is so strong in the United States that President Obama issued a memorandum advising the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies to
incorporate more transparency into government processes. See Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009), available at
https://www.federalregister.gov/articles/2009/01/26/E9-1777/transparency-and-open-government#page4685.
223. See id.
224. See Berg, supra note 11.
225. Id.
226. See generally 528 U.S. 119 (2000).
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tion—but crime type as well. Judges should require law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to present quantitative data to demonstrate that an area
labeled as high-crime is in fact high-crime.
Law enforcement agencies will likely claim that procuring and preserving the quantitative data an officer used to justify a finding of reasonable suspicion is too burdensome of a responsibility. However, this is not the
case. Technological advancements in the United States have created an
overarching public expectation of transparency in government222 and have
made it easier for government agencies to preserve data. In order to safeguard this transparency, many Americans’ believe that government agencies have an institutional responsibility to preserve data that is critical to
maintaining this transparency.223 The widespread growth of cloud computing has made it easy for government agencies to store vast quantities of
data without overburdening their resources,224 and fulfill the public’s expectations for government transparency.
As explained in Part I, predictive policing technologies have the capability of not only forecasting where crime will occur on a micro-scale of
a 500-foot radius, but can also predict the specific types of crime that are
likely to occur at a given location in a community.225 Therefore, predictive
policing software has the capability of meaningfully defining high-crime
areas based on both geographic location and crime-type. Harnessing the
full technological capabilities of this software enables law enforcement
agencies to eliminate the vague and generic “high-crime area” label.
Existing vague high-crime area definitions can be replaced by specific
classifications of criminal activity, such as designating a location as a
“high-brown heroin drug trafficking area” or “high-residential robbery
area.” Using these crime specific classifications will help restore individuals’ Fourth Amendment protections in communities that were historically
characterized as high-crime under Wardlow’s vague and overbroad standard.226 Narrowly defining crime areas can help restore Fourth Amendment
protections by tightening the required nexus between direct observation of
suspicious conduct and an area’s propensity for crime.
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Tightening this nexus will make police officers more accountable for
their stop-and-frisk activity, and limit the role that a person’s presence in a
high-crime area can play when searching based on reasonable suspicion.
Moreover, if law enforcement wants to benefit from predictive policing
technology’s ability to predict crime in a 500-foot radius, then law enforcement should be constrained by this same specificity. An officer should
be required to use the same level of specificity to prove that she had reasonable suspicion to perform a Terry stop of a suspect in an area alleged to
have a high propensity for a specific crime type.
Finally, because predictive policing technology is “[m]ore objective
than a patrol officer’s hunch about an area”227 and harnesses the power of
big data to find patterns of criminal activity based on statistical algorithms,
judges should place the burden on law enforcement agencies and prosecutors to present quantitative data supporting their high-crime designation.
Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors should carry the burden of
demonstrating that the data relied upon reflects a high-crime rate for the
specific type of criminal activity the police officer suspected was afoot.
For example, if we applied the facts of Terry v. Ohio to a community
using predictive policing software under this proposed model, would the
court still find that Officer McFadden, the officer in Terry, had the requisite
reasonable suspicion to perform a stop-and-frisk?228 Officer McFadden
could meet the threshold requirement for particularized suspicion because
he watched the suspects walk back and forth past the jewelry store alone
dozens of time, and each time stopping to peer in the window.229 However,
officer McFadden’s finding of reasonable suspicion could be further bolstered if ten minutes before seeing the two suspects walking by the jewelry
store, the predictive policing software installed in his patrol car corroborated his belief that the neighborhood had a high propensity for nonresidential burglary.230 Although, the facts of Terry are straightforward
because of the suspects’ repetitive behavior, this example demonstrates
how a court could use quantitative data as a tool to decide whether a lawful
Terry stop was performed in an alleged high-crime area.
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As Cornel West wrote in his forward to the New Jim Crow, “Martin
Luther King Jr. called for us to be lovestruck with each other, not colorblind toward each other. To be lovestruck is to care, to have deep compassion, and to be concerned for each and every individual, including the poor
and vulnerable.”231 As a society, we have an obligation to protect the civil
rights of all people, including the poor and vulnerable. Restoring Fourth
Amendment protections to low-income minority communities is essential
to creating a socially just world.
Predictive policing technologies can play a critical role in restoring
Fourth Amendment protections to neighborhoods historically stamped with
the “high-crime area” label. To ensure that this technology is used fairly
and responsibly by law enforcement agencies, it is critical to establish both
neutral third party oversight and mandatory uniform standards. The latest
generation of predictive policing technology has the ability to forecast
crime, based on both geography and specific crime type, and can be used to
help courts and police departments narrowly define “high-crime areas.”
Establishing narrowly defined high-crime areas based on quantitative data,
will enable the courts to play an essential role in restoring Fourth Amendment protections to people living in low-income minority neighborhoods.
Tightening the nexus between observed suspicious behavior and suspected criminal activity will help people living in these heavily policed
neighborhoods recapture their eroded Fourth Amendment rights. Using
quantitative data to narrowly define high-crime areas will require police
officers to rely on more than a “hunch” to prove that an area has a high
propensity for crime. And in turn, officers will be less likely to perform the
arbitrary and intrusive stop-and-frisks to which many of the young minority
men in these neighborhoods have grown accustomed.

